Schickler that party loyalties are rooted in voters' social identities, we find that party identification is much more strongly related to voters' ideological preferences than to their social identities as defined by their group memberships. Since the 1970s, Republican identification has increased substantially among whites inside and outside of the South with the most dramatic gains occurring among married voters, men and Catholics. Within these subgroups, however, Republican gains have occurred mainly or exclusively among self-identified conservatives. As a result, the relationship between ideology and party identification has increased dramatically. This has important implications for voting behavior. Increased consistency between ideology and party identification has contributed to higher levels of party loyalty in presidential and congressional elections. We find much that is persuasive about the evidence presented in Partisan Hearts and Minds. We agree with its conclusions that party identification is usually quite stable at both the individual and the aggregate level, that party loyalties are relatively immune from short-term fluctuations in economic conditions and presidential popularity, and that party identification exerts a powerful influence on evaluations of political leaders and voting decisions. However, we take issue with the claim that partisan change in the American electorate in recent years has been limited exclusively to southern whites. We present evidence in this paper that there has been a substantial increase in Republican identification among white voters outside of the South over the past three decades and that this shift has been quite dramatic among several major subgroups including men, Catholics, and the religiously devout. We further show that the extent and direction of these shifts are strongly related to ideology, that the correlation between ideology and party identification has increased substantially over time across a wide variety of social 4 groups, and that this increase is not due simply to generational replacement. We also present evidence that the increasing correlation between ideology and party identification over time is due primarily to the influence of ideology on party identification.
In Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters,
argue that party identification in the United States is based on voters' social identities rather than on a rational assessment of the parties' policies or performance in office. Challenging many of the conclusions of recent research on party identification in the American electorate, Partisan Hearts and Minds has attracted the attention of pundits (Brooks 2004) as well as scholars.
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler make four major claims about the nature of contemporary party identification:
1. Party identification is more stable at both the aggregate and the individual level than most recent scholarship has suggested. Outside of the South, there has been little change in the distribution of party identification in the U.S. for several decades (pp. 52-84).
2. Voters' party loyalties are largely insulated from the effects of current issues such as the state of the economy and the performance of the incumbent president (pp. 85-108).
3. Party loyalties exert a powerful influence on citizens' issue positions, evaluations of political leaders, and voting decisions (pp. 204-229) .
4. Most importantly, party identification is based mainly on identification with social groups rather than a rational evaluation of the parties' ideological orientations or policies (pp. 25-51) . According to Green et al., " people ask themselves two questions when deciding which party to support: What kinds of social groups come to mind as I think about Democrats, Republicans, and Independents? Which assemblage of groups (if any) best describes me (p. 8)?"
In proposing this social identity theory, Green et al. explicitly challenge rational choice explanations of party identification such as those proposed by Downs (1957) and Fiorina (1981) . Green et al. view party identification as an emotional attachment grounded in enduring group loyalties rather than a deliberate choice based on a preference for one set of policy positions over another-a choice that can be modified if parties' policy positions change or new issues arise (Page and Jones 1979; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Carmines, McIver, and Stimson 1987; Luskin, McIver, and Carmines 1989; Franklin 1992) . Like Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) , Green et al. downplay the role of issues and ideology in the formation of party identification. While recognizing that party loyalties can be influenced by dramatic changes in the parties' policy stands or ideological positions, Green et al. argue that such shifts are relatively rare and generally confined to periods of major realignment such as the New Deal era in the United States.
In this regard, social identity theory stands in sharp contrast to ideological realignment theory which claims that as a result of the growing ideological polarization of the two major parties since the 1980s, Americans have increasingly been choosing a party identification on the basis of their ideological preferences, leading to a gradual realignment of party loyalties along ideological lines (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998 ).
According to Green et al., even the one exception to the rule of partisan stability in recent American political history, the dramatic realignment of southern white voters' party loyalties since the end of World War II, was based more on changing perceptions of the parties' ties to social groups than on issues or ideology. They argue that as southerners began to assume leadership positions in the Republican Party during the 1980s and 1990s, Republicanism came to be seen as a respectable affiliation among white southerners. According to Green et al., " As the Republican image improved, Republican identification became increasingly prevalent among all segments of the ideological continuum (p. 160)." Green et al. argue We find much that is persuasive about the evidence presented in Partisan Hearts and Minds. We agree with its conclusions that party identification is usually quite stable at both the individual and the aggregate level, that party loyalties are relatively immune from short-term fluctuations in economic conditions and presidential popularity, and that party identification exerts a powerful influence on evaluations of political leaders and voting decisions. However, we take issue with the claim that partisan change in the American electorate in recent years has been limited exclusively to southern whites. We present evidence in this paper that there has been a substantial increase in Republican identification among white voters outside of the South over the past three decades and that this shift has been quite dramatic among several major subgroups including men, Catholics, and the religiously devout. We further show that the extent and direction of these shifts are strongly related to ideology, that the correlation between ideology and party identification has increased substantially over time across a wide variety of social groups, and that this increase is not due simply to generational replacement. We also present evidence that the increasing correlation between ideology and party identification over time is due primarily to the influence of ideology on party identification.
Most fundamentally, we take issue with the claim that party identification in the U.S. is based mainly on the social identities of citizens rather than their ideological orientations or policy preferences. In fact, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler never actually test this social identity theory, nor do they compare the influence of social background characteristics with the influence of issues and ideology. They argue that, "we lack the luxury of examining a broad range of social identities [because] social class, ethnicity, religion, and party exhaust the list of social categories about which we have adequate longitudinal data (p. 83)."
We find this argument unpersuasive. While measures of identification with social groups may not be widely available, measures of objective membership in a large variety of social groups are widely available and social identity theorists generally view objective membership as a necessary condition for identification with a group and the development of group political consciousness (Gurin, Miller and Gurin 1980; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Tajfel 1981; Turner 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Gurin 1985; Turner 1987 ). Tajfel (1981) , for example, defines social identity as, "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership (p. 255)."
In addition to social class, ethnicity, and religion, data on age, race, gender, region, urban-rural residence, and union affiliation are available in the American National Election Studies and many other surveys conducted over the past fifty years. Along with social class, ethnicity, and religion, these are precisely the social characteristics most commonly associated with support for the major parties in the United States. Social identity theory clearly implies that voters who belong to groups generally associated with one major party or the other-groups such as the poor, union members, single women, and Jews in the case of the Democratic Party, or the wealthy, married men, and evangelicals in the case of the Republican Party-should be more likely to identify with that party. Based on this reasoning, we test the social identity theory by examining the influence on party identification of membership in a wide variety of social groups that are closely aligned with the two major parties. Our results indicate that while there is a group basis to party loyalties, most of these social characteristics are only weakly related to party identification. With the exception of the overwhelmingly Democratic identification of African Americans, party identification is much more strongly related to voters' ideological orientations than to their social identities as defined by their group memberships.
We believe that our evidence shows that there is a much larger rational component to party identification that Green et al. acknowledge 
Trends in Party Identification
One of the key claims made by Green et al. is that outside of the South there has been little change in partisanship since the 1960s. However, this claim appears to be contradicted by a considerable body of research that has documented changes in partisanship based on such factors as gender (Wirls 1986; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999) , marital status (Weisberg 1987) , religiosity (Guth and Green 1990; Layman and Carmines 1997 ) and social class (Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003) .
In order to test the claim that partisanship outside of the South has been stable, The evidence presented in Table 1 does not support the conclusion that outside of party identification outside of the South has been stable since the 1960s. Although the most dramatic change has occurred among white southerners, there has also been a substantial increase in Republican identification among whites outside of the South. Outside of the South, Republican gains have been much larger in certain white subgroups than in the overall white electorate. Table 2 [ Table 2 goes here]
Ideology in the American Electorate: Meaning and Measurement
The evidence examined thus far indicates that since the 1970s there has been a substantial increase in Republican identification among whites outside the South as well as among those in the South and that this increase has been quite dramatic among certain subgroups such as Catholics. But why has this shift occurred? Contrary to Green et al., we believe that ideology has played a major role in producing a secular realignment of party loyalties in the United States since the 1970s. According to this ideological realignment hypothesis, the increasing clarity of ideological differences between the parties during the Reagan and post-Reagan eras has made it easier for citizens to choose a party identification based on their ideological orientations.
Before examining the impact of ideological orientations on party identification, however, we need to demonstrate that members of the public, or at least a substantial proportion of them, have meaningful ideological orientations. While the concept of ideology has been defined in many different ways (Gerring 1997) , political scientists generally view an ideology as a set of beliefs about the role of government that shapes responses to a wide range of specific policy issues (Converse 1964; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985) . Among political elites in the U.S., positions on a wide range of economic, social, and foreign policy issues appear to be structured by a single liberal-conservative dimension (Poole and Rosenthal 1991) . However, the extent of ideological thinking in the public has been a subject of debate since the publication of Converse's (1964) seminal study of belief systems in mass publics which suggested that awareness of ideological concepts and use of such concepts by ordinary citizens were quite limited.
Although some subsequent studies have supported Converse's conclusions about the lack of ideological sophistication among the general public in the U.S. (Axelrod 1967; Bishop, Oldenick, Tuchfarber, and Bennett 1978; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1978; Conover and Feldman 1981; Knight 1985; Jennings 1992) , other studies have suggested that the ability of ordinary citizens to comprehend and employ ideological concepts depends on the extent and clarity of ideological cues provided by political elites.
According to this view, the greater the prevalence and clarity of ideological cues in the political environment, the higher the level of ideological comprehension and reasoning should be among the electorate (Field and Anderson 1969; Nie and Anderson 1974; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979; Nie and Rabjohn 1979; Craig and Hurley 1984; Jacoby 1995) .
From this standpoint, the increased ideological polarization of the parties in recent years and the increased salience of ideological conflict in the media should have produced an increase in ideological comprehension and reasoning among the American public.
While we do not claim that ordinary citizens in the U.S. now possess belief systems as elaborate or constrained as those evident among political activists and elites (Jennings 1992; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004) , our evidence does point to a substantial increase in the ability of citizens to apply ideological labels to the political parties, an increase in the coherence of citizens' views across different issues, and a growing connection between the ideological labels that citizens choose and their positions on a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues.
In 1972, when the NES began asking respondents to place themselves and the two major parties on a 7-point liberal-conservative scale, only 48 percent of respondents were able to place themselves on the scale and to place the Democratic Party to the left of the Republican Party. By 1996 and 2004, however, 67 percent of respondents were able to place themselves on the scale and to place the Democrats to the left of the Republicans.
These results indicate that public awareness of ideological differences between the parties has increased substantially in the past three decades.
The NES data also indicate that there has also been an increase in the ideological coherence of citizens' policy preferences and in the correlation between ideological identification and policy preferences. Table 3 [ Table 3 goes here]
The increasing value of Cronbach's alpha over time indicates that citizens' responses to these 8 questions have become more internally consistent since 1984. In addition, contrary to the claim that ideological labels have little policy content for most Americans (Conover and Feldman 1981) , the evidence in Table 3 shows that liberalconservative self-identification was strongly related to preferences on every policy issue in every survey and that this relationship has grown stronger over time. These results indicate that there is an ideological structure to Americans' opinions on policy issues and that ideological self-identification is a valid indicator of the liberalism or conservatism of citizens' policy orientations.
In testing the ideological realignment hypothesis, we use different measures of ideology with different data sets. We use the 7-point ideological identification scale to classify respondents in NES surveys as liberal (1-3), moderate (4), or conservative (5-7) since this question is correlated with preferences on a wide range of policy issues and it has been included in every survey since 1972. We use a similar ideological identification question with three response categories-liberal, moderate, and conservative-in our analysis of 2004 national exit poll data because the split-sample procedures used in the exit poll make it impossible to create a multiple-item scale for the entire sample.
However, in our analyses of the 1992-1996 NES panel survey and the 2004 NES survey we measure ideological orientations with multiple-item scales that include the 7-point ideological identification question along with a number of questions about specific policy issues.
The 1992-1996 ideology scale is based on 11 items included in both the 1992 and 1996 waves of the panel: liberal-conservative identification, abortion, government aid to blacks, defense spending, the death penalty, laws barring discrimination against gays and lesbians, allowing gays and lesbians to serve in the military, government vs. personal responsibility for jobs and living standards, government vs. private responsibility for health insurance, government spending and services, and the role of women in society.
Because of the small number of respondents interviewed in both waves of the panel, we recoded all of the 7-point issue scales to place respondents with no opinion in the middle position (4) in order to avoid losing cases due to missing data. In order to test the ideological realignment hypothesis, we will first examine trends in party identification among some of the white subgroups that have experienced the largest Republican gains since the 1970s, while controlling for ideological identification.
If the ideological realignment hypothesis is correct, we should find that Republican gains have been greatest among conservative identifiers and smallest among liberal identifiers.
[ Table 4 goes here]
The evidence presented in Table 4 provides strong support for the ideological realignment hypothesis. For every subgroup examined, the increase in Republican identification was much larger among conservative identifiers than among moderate or liberal identifiers. In fact, Republican identification declined among liberal identifiers in every subgroup except Catholics. Among southern whites, for example, there was a 54 point increase in net Republican identification among conservatives and a 7 point decrease in net Republican identification among liberals. Similarly, among religiously observant whites, there was a 40 point increase in net Republican identification among conservatives and an 18 point decrease in net Republican identification among liberals.
The end result of the process of ideological realignment has been a marked increase in the correlation between ideology and party identification. Table 5 displays the trend in the correlation between ideology and party identification between the 1970s and 2004 for the entire electorate and for several major subgroups. The correlation between ideology and party identification increases in all groups including southern and non-southern whites. In fact, the increase in the correlation between ideology and party identification is just as great for non-southern whites as it is for southern whites.
[ Table 5 goes here]
The increasing correlation between ideology and party identification was not simply a result of generational replacement. Table 6 presents the results of a cohort analysis of the relationship between ideology and party identification among northern and southern whites from the 1970s through the 1990s. Almost every 10-year age cohort shows an increase in the correlation between ideology and party identification over time. For example, among southern whites who were in their 20s during the 1970s, the correlation between ideology and party identification was only .27. However, among members of the same cohort during the 1990s, the correlation between ideology and party identification was .54. Similarly, among northern whites who were in their 20s during the 1970s, the correlation between ideology and party identification was only .34.
However, among members of the same cohort during the 1990s, the correlation between ideology and party identification was .61.
[ Table 6 goes here]
Ideological Realignment vs. Partisan Persuasion Among White Southerners and Catholics
The evidence examined thus far indicates that the relationship between ideology and party identification became considerably stronger among both northern and southern whites who remained in the electorate between the 1970s and the 1990s. However, cohort analysis does not allow us to determine whether ideology was influencing party identification, as the ideological realignment hypothesis suggests, or whether party identification was influencing ideology, as Green et al. suggest. It is possible that the increasing clarity of ideological differences between the parties during the 1980s and 1990s caused Democratic and Republican partisans to adopt ideological positions consistent with their existing party loyalties in a process that might be termed partisan persuasion. However, partisan persuasion cannot explain increasing More recently, gender, marital status, sexual orientation, and religious beliefs have emerged as important correlates of party affiliation: members of traditional families and those with strong religious convictions tend to be Republicans while singles, gays, and less religious voters tend to be Democrats.
The changing relationship between social groups and the parties raises the question of whether membership in social groups has a direct impact on party identification, as the social identity theory proposes, or whether partisan differences between social groups are simply a result of the policy preferences of group members. According to this ideological differences hypothesis, the reason that some groups such as white evangelicals have become increasingly Republican in recent years while other groups such as gays and lesbians have become increasingly Democratic is because of the policy preferences of their members.
As a first test of the social identity and ideological differences hypotheses, Table 7 presents data from the 2004 national exit poll on net party identification among members of a number of groups that are closely aligned with either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party, controlling for ideological orientation. We measured the ideological orientations of respondents in the exit poll with the three-point liberal-conservative identification question because this question was included in all three versions of the exit poll questionnaire.
[Table 7 goes here]
The results in Table 7 show that, except for African-Americans, the differences between liberals and conservatives within each social group were much larger than the differences between social groups. African-Americans, regardless of their ideological The results in Table 7 provide only limited supported for the social identity theory.
It is true that the partisan orientations of certain groups cannot be completely explained by their policy preferences. For African-Americans, in particular, social identity and party identification seem to be closely connected. African-Americans, regardless of ideology, tend to be Democrats. For other groups, however, the connection between social identity and party identification is much weaker or nonexistent. In order to directly compare the effects of ideology and group membership on contemporary party identification, we performed a logistic regression analysis of party identification. Our dependent variable in this analysis was a dichotomous measure of party identification with strong, weak, and independent Democrats classified as Democrats and strong, weak, and independent Republicans classified as Republicans.
Pure independents were excluded from the analysis.
3 Independent variables in the analysis included a 16-item liberal-conservative scale and a variety of social background characteristics including age, education, income, gender, marital status, religion, church attendance, and household union affiliation. The results of the logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 8 .
[ Table 8 goes here]
To facilitate comparisons of the effects of the independent variables on party identification, we converted each of the logistic regression coefficients into a change in probability score. This score can be interpreted as the change in the probability of identifying with the Republican Party associated with a change between categories of any of the dichotomous independent variables such as gender, union membership, or martial status, or the change in probability associated with a change between the 25 th percentile and the 75 th percentile on any of the continuous independent variables such as age, education, or ideology.
The major conclusion that emerges from Table 8 is that the impact of ideology on party identification was much stronger than that of any of the social background variables. Most of the estimated coefficients for the social background variables are not statistically significant. In addition, the change in probability scores for most of the social background variables are generally small, with the largest effect (.16) being for education. Many social characteristics including age, income, gender, martial status, and church attendance had little or no impact on party identification after controlling for ideology. In contrast, the estimated coefficient for the ideology scale is highly statistically significant and the change in probability score is almost four times larger than that for education. Even after controlling for social background characteristics, the probability of identifying with the Republican Party was 63 percentage points higher for a voter at the 75 th percentile of the liberal conservative scale than it was for a voter at the Group 1962 Group -1970 Group 1972 Group -1980 Group 1982 Group -1990 Group 1992 Group -2000 Group 2002 Group -2004 1962-1970 1972-1980 1982-1990 1992-2000 2002-2004 Note: Product-moment correlations between 7-point party identification scale and 7-point liberal-conservative scale. All coefficients are highly statistically significant (p < .001). 
